IKE’S LIST OF DOMAINS AT AUCTION FOR Tuesday, July 18th

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The No Bid List

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Godaddy Value BIN

Available Names

Available for Reg Fee big list

Have a name at auction and need more exposure? Send me an email. We Charge $10 per name per day. We may be able to help. If you have an auction you want to promote, email us for details.*All names chosen by us, Shane and Josh . (ie you click through and purchase a name you like) or an occasional paid listing. Everything we say is based on our own research or is opinion. Do your own due diligence. That means look it up yourself if you don’t think the stats or our opinion is correct. We hand choose the names but we are paid to make this list by both the auction houses, individuals that are auctioning names, and Godaddy affiliate links. Keep that in mind and only buy names that YOU think are good

The post IKE’S LIST OF DOMAINS AT AUCTION FOR Tuesday, July 18th appeared first on DSAD.

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Nation Scale Internet Filtering — Do’s and Don’ts

CircleID CircleID: If a national government wants to prevent certain kinds of Internet communication inside its borders, the costs can be extreme and success will never be more than partial. VPN and tunnel technologies will keep improving as long as there is demand, and filtering or blocking out every such technology will be a never-ending game of one-upmanship. Everyone knows and will always know that determined Internet users will find a way to get to what they want, but sometimes the symbolic message is more important than the operational results. In this article, I will describe some current and prior approaches to this problem, and also, make some recommendations doing nation-state Internet filtering in the most responsible and constructive manner.

History, Background, and SOPA

For many years, China's so-called Great Firewall has mostly stopped most law-abiding people including both citizens and visitors from accessing most of the Internet content that the Chinese government does not approve of. As a frequent visitor to China, I find it a little odd that my Verizon Wireless data roaming is implemented as a tunnel back to the USA, and is therefore unfiltered. Whereas, when I'm on a local WiFi network, I'm behind the Great Firewall, unable to access Facebook, Twitter, and so on. The downside of China's approach is that I've been slow to expand my business there — I will not break the law, and I need my employees to have access to the entire Internet.

Another example is Italy's filtering policy regarding unlicensed (non-taxpaying) online gambling, which was blocked not by a national "Great Firewall" but rather SOPA-style DNS filtering mandated for Italian ISP's. The visible result was an uptick in the use of Google DNS (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4) by Italian gamblers, and if there was also an increase in gambling tax revenue, that was not widely reported. The downside here is the visible cracks in Italian society — many of Italians apparently do not trust their own government. Furthermore, in 2013 the European Union ruled that this kind of filtering was a violation of EU policy.

In Turkey up until 2016, the government had similar protections in place, not about gambling but rather pornography and terrorism and anti-Islamic hate speech. The filtering was widely respected, showing that the Turkish people and their government were more closely aligned at that time than was evident during the Italian experiment. It was possible for Turkish internet users to opt-out of the government's Internet filtering regime, but such opt-out requests were uncommon. This fit the Internet's cooperation-based foundation perfectly: where interests are aligned, cooperation is possible, but where interests are not aligned, unilateral mandates are never completely effective.

In the years since the SOPA debacle in the United States, I've made it my priority to discuss with the entertainment and luxury goods industries the business and technical problems posed to them by the Internet. Away from the cameras, most executives freely admit that it's not possible to prevent determined users from reaching any part of the Internet they might seek, including so-called "pirate" sites which may even be "dedicated to infringement". I learned however that there is a class of buyers, of both music and movies and luxury goods, who are not interested in infringement per se, and who are often simply misled by "pirate" Internet sites who pretend to be legitimate. One estimate was that only 1/3rd of commercial music is bought legally, and the remaining 2/3rd is roughly divided between dedicated (1/3rd) and accidental (1/3rd) infringement. If so, then getting the accidental infringers who comprise 1/3rd of the market to buy their music legally wouldn't change the cost of music for those buyers, but could raise the music industry's revenues by 100%. We should all think of that as a "win-win-win" possibility.

Speaking for myself, I'd rather live and act within the law, respecting intellectual property rights, and using my so-called "dollar votes" to encourage more commercial art to be produced. I fought SOPA not because I believed that content somehow "wanted to be free", but because this kind of filtering will only be effective where the end-users see it as a benefit — see it, in other words, as aligned with their interests. That's why I co-invented the DNS RPZ firewall system back in 2010, which allows security policy subscribers to automatically connect to their providers in near-realtime, and to then cooperate on wide-scale filtering of DNS content based on a shared security policy. This is the technology that SOPA would have used, except, SOPA would have been widely bypassed, and where not bypassed, would have prohibited DNSSEC deployment. American Internet users are more like Italians than Turks — they don't want their government telling them what they can't do.

I think, though, that every government ought to offer this kind of DNS filtering, so that any Internet user in that country who wants to see only the subset of the Internet considered safe by their national government, can get that behavior as a service. Some users, including me, would be happy to follow such policy advice even though we'd fight against any similar policy mandate. In my case, I'd be willing to pay extra to get this kind of filtering. My nation's government invests a lot of time and money identifying illegal web sites, whether dedicated to terrorism, or infringement, or whatever. I'd like them to publish their findings in real time using an open and unencumbered protocol like DNS RPZ, so that those of us who want to avoid those varieties of bad stuff can voluntarily do so. In fact, the entertainment industry could do the same — because I don't want to be an accidental infringer either.

Future, Foreground, and Specific Approaches

While human ingenuity can sometimes seem boundless, a nation-state exerting any kind of control over Internet reachability within its borders has only three broad choices available to them.

First, the Great Firewall approach. In this scenario, the government is on-path and can witness, modify, or insert traffic directly. This is costly, both in human resources, services, equipment, electric power, and prestige. It's necessary for every in-country Internet Service Provider who wants an out-of-country connection, to work directly with government agencies or agents to ensure that real time visibility and control are among the government's powers. This may require that all Internet border crossings occur in some central location, or it may require that the government's surveillance and traffic modification capabilities be installed in multiple discrete locations. In addition to hard costs, there will be soft costs like errors and omissions which induce unexplained failures. The inevitable effects on the nation's economy must be considered, since a "Great Firewall" approach must by definition wall the country off from mainstream human ideas, with associated chilling effects on outside investment. Finally, this approach, like all access policies, can be bypassed by a determined-enough end-user who is willing to ignore the law. The "Great Firewall" approach will maximize the bypass costs, having first maximized deployment costs.

Second, a distributed announcement approach using Internet Protocol address-level firewalls. Every user and every service on the Internet has to have one or more IP addresses from which to send, or to which receive, packets to or from other Internet participants. While the user-side IP addresses tend to be migratory and temporary in nature due to mobile users or address-pool sharing, the server-side IP addresses tend to be well known, pre-announced, and predictable. If a national government can compel all of its Internet Service Providers to listen for "IP address firewall" configuration information from a government agency, and to program its own local firewalls in accordance with the government's then-current access policies, then it would have the effect of making distant (out-of-country) services deliberately unreachable by in-country users. Like all policy efforts, this can be bypassed, either by in-country (user) effort, or by out-of-country (service) provider effort, or by middle-man proxy or VPN provider effort. Bypass will be easier than in the Great Firewall approach described above, but a strong advantage of this approach is that the government does not have to be on-path, and so everyone's deployment costs are considerably lower.

Third and finally, a distributed announcement approach using IP Domain Name System (DNS-level) firewalls. Every Internet access requires at least one DNS lookup, and these lookups can be interrupted according to policy if the end-user and Internet Service Provider (ISP) are willing to cooperate on the matter. A policy based firewall operating at the DNS level can interrupt communications based on several possible criteria: either a "domain name" can be poisoned, or a "name server", or an "address result". In each case, the DNS element to be poisoned has to be discovered and advertised in advance, exactly as in the "address-level firewall" and "Great Firewall" approaches described above. However, DNS lookups are far less frequent than packet-level transmissions, and so the deployment cost of a DNS-level firewall will be far lower than for a packet-level firewall. A DNS firewall can be constructed using off the shelf "open source" software using the license-free "DNS Response Policy Zone" (DNS RPZ) technology first announced in 2010. The DNS RPZ system allows an unlimited number of DNS operators ("subscribers") to synchronize their DNS firewall policy to one or more "providers" such as national governments or industry trade associations. DNS firewalls offer the greatest ease of bypass, so much so that it's better to say that "end-user cooperation is assumed," which could be a feature rather than a bug.

Conclusion

A national government who wants to make a difference in the lived Internet experience of its citizens should consider not just the hard deployment and operational costs, but also the soft costs to the overall economy, and in prestige, and especially, what symbolic message is intended. If safety as defined by the government is to be seen as a goal it shares with its citizens and that will be implemented using methods and policies agreed to by its citizens, then ease of bypass should not be a primary consideration. Rather, ease of participation, and transparency of operation will be the most important ingredients for success.
Written by Paul Vixie, CEO, Farsight SecurityFollow CircleID on TwitterMore under: Access Providers, Censorship, DNS, Intellectual Property, Internet Governance, Networks, Policy & Regulation

The post Nation Scale Internet Filtering — Do’s and Don’ts appeared first on iGoldRush Domain News and Resources.

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